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FORMAL ONTOLOGY, PROPOSITIONAL 
IDENTITY AND TRUTH 
In the philosophical tradition, propositions have a double nature. On 
one hand, they are units of sense of a fundamental logical type. They are 
senses of sentences provided with truth conditions. Each proposition is true 
in a circumstance when it represents a fact which exists in that 
circumstance. So any analysis of the logical form of propositions requires a 
theory of truth. On the other hand, propositions are also the contents of 
conceptual thoughts that we, human beings, have whenever we represent 
facts of the world (1). In particular, they are the contents of illocutionary 
acts like assertions, promises and questions that we perform in the use of 
language. They are also the contents of our attitudes (beliefs, desires, 
intentions) towards objects and facts. As Frege pointed out, the two intrinsic 
aspects of propositions are logically related. For we cannot express a 
propositional content in thinking and speaking without relating it eo ipso to 
the world with a certain force (2). Any literal meaningful utterance of an 
elementary sentence is always an attempt by the speaker to perform an 
illocutionary act with a force F and a propositional content P (3). So force, 
sense and denotation are the three basic components of sentence meaning in 
the logical structure of language. And the proposition which is the sense of 
an elementary sentence in a context of utterance is also the content of the 
elementary illocutionary act that the speaker of that context would mean to 
perform if he or she were using that single sentence literally. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to formulate a new theory of sense and denotation 
that takes into account the double nature of propositions. The fact that 
propositions are contents of conceptual thoughts imposes to prepositional 
logic many conditions of material and formal adequacy that logicians have 
unfortunately tended to neglect until now. We, human agents, have 
cognitive abilities which are both restricted and creative. We can only utter 
a finite number of sentences and make a finite number of acts of reference 
and predication in a context of utterance. So we can only have in mind a 
finite number of propositions with a finite structure of constituents. 
However we are free and creative. We can understand infinitely many 
sentences, utter new sentences and have new thoughts. We are neither 
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omniscient nor perfectly rational. We understand most ршри .ишп 11li<uit 
knowing whether they are true or false. We often make I a I • ,i•,,. i Hi иг, inul 
sometimes believe necessarily false propositions. Itni vvi tin .11 
minimally consistent in a sense that remains to be explained l'i<>|><<м1 ичш1 
logic has to account for such facts. In particular, the iluciv nl Htllli lot 
propositions must be compatible with the theory of sin-rev. 11111I >11-. I .u imn 
for illocutionary acts. By nature, illocutionary acts have li lieily eniidilions 
(Austin [1956]). Attempts to perform illocutionary acls can :.in 1 eed ui lad. 
In order to succeed to perform an illocutionary act a speiilu-i I I I I I N I ишке a 
right attempt in a right context. Moreover illocutionary m-l,-. aie .lne< led al 
objects and facts in the world. Speakers in general allempl to mlueve a 
success of fit between words and things. Their illoi iilnmm у aels arc 
satisfied only if represented facts turn out to be existent In particular, 
assertions are satisfied when they are true, promises are sale.lied when tliey 
are kept and directives when they are obeyed. As Searlo and I pointed out 
(4), there is no way to elaborate an adequate theory of success and 
satisfaction for illocutionary acts without identifying their contents with 
propositions. So the formal ontology of illocutionary logic is realist. 
Moreover success, satisfaction and truth are logically related. So we need a 
unified theory of force, sense and denotation (5). Unfortunately, current 
philosophical logics of sense and denotation are incompatible with an 
adequate analysis of thought. Standard modal, temporal, epistemic, 
intensional and agentive logics are based on Carnap's definition of the 
logical type of propositions. They tend to reduce propositions to their truth 
conditions. Such a reduction is incompatible with contemporary philosophy 
of language, mind and action. From a philosophical point of view, strict 
equivalence (the property of having the same truth values in the same 
circumstances) is not a su .cient criterion of prepositional identity. Many 
speech acts with the same illocutionary force and strictly equivalent 
prepositional contents have di_erent success and sincerity conditions. Thus 
the assertion (or belief) that Ottawa is the capital of Canada is di_erenl from 
the assertion (or belief) that Ottawa is the capital of Canada and not a real 
number. I will formulate an analysis of the logical form of propositions 
which is adequate for the purpose of the theory of speaker and sentence 
meaning. On my view, the primary units of meaning in the use and 
comprehension of language are not isolated propositions but complete 
illocutionary acts of the form F(P) provided with felicity rather than truth 
conditions. So no proposition can be the sense of a sentence in a context of 
utterance according to a possible semantic interpretation unless it is also a 
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possible content of illocutionary act. My notion of proposition is general; it 
covers senses of all types of sentence (declarative or not). The same 
proposition can be the common sense of sentences of di_erent syntactic 
types e.g. "You will help Paul" and "Please, help Paul!" just as it can be the 
common content of illocutionary acts with di_erent forces (6). This chapter 
has the following content. The first section presents the formal ontology of 
my theory of types of sense and denotation and the second section my 
analysis of the logical type of proposition. The third section formulates a 
concise definition of truth according to predication and explicates a new 
relation of strong propositional implication which is important for the 
account of rationality. The fourth section illustrates my theory of sense; it 
proceeds to the analysis of modal and temporal propositions within the logic 
of ramified time. That section defines the ideographic object language of a 
rich philosophical logic. The fifth section presents the formal semantics of 
that logic and the sixth section an axiomatic system where valid laws are 
provable. Finally, the last section states a series of important valid laws 
governing truth, prepositional identity and strong implication. It shows 
striking di_erences existing between my logic of sense and current modal 
and intensional logics of Lewis, Carnap and Montague, Hintikka's 
epistemic logic, Belnap's logic of relevance, Parry's logic of analytic 
implication and CresswelFs hyperintensional logic. 
1. THEORY OF TYPES 
On the basis of preceding considerations about thought and meaning, I 
advocate a Frege — Church formal ontology much richer than that of 
Russell (7). I propose to stratify as follows the universe of discourse in the 
theory of types of philosophical logic (8): 
1. There are three primitive types of denotation: the type e of 
individuals, the type t of truth values and the type s of success values. 
Individuals are particular objects like material bodies and persons existing 
in actual or possible courses of the world. They are objects of reference of 
the simplest logical kind. There is at least one individual in the world. So 
there is a non empty set Individuals of individual objects in the universe of 
discourse. The two truth values are truth and falsity and the two success 
values success and insuccess (9). 
2. There are two primitive types of sense: the type с of concepts of 
individuals and the type r of attributes of individuals. Properties of 
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individuals like being alive and, for each number n _ 2, relations of degree n 
between individuals like being taller than are attributes of individuals. In my 
symbolism, Concepts is ihe set of individual concepts and Attributes (lie set 
of attributes of individuals. So the set of primitive senses is the union 
Concepts [ Attributes. As Frege and Church pointed out, (here is a 
fundamental relation of correspondence between senses and denotations in 
the universe of discourse. Actual denotations of certain types correspond to 
senses in possible circumstances (10). Thus propositions, which are senses 
of sentences, have truth values as denotations; they are either true or false in 
each circumstance. Concepts of individual objects, which arc senses of 
referring expressions like the king of France, have single individuals as 
denotations: they apply to at most one individual object in each 
circumstance. The denotation corresponding to a sense can of course vary 
from one circumstance to another. In the logic of ramified time and of 
action, each circumstance is a pair m/h of a moment of time m and of a 
history h to which that moment belongs. Di erent persons have been king of 
France in the past. In certain circumstances no individual falls under a 
concept. There is no actual king of France at the present moment. There is a 
next king of France in a circumstance m/h when someone becomes king at a 
moment m' posterior to m in the history h. Properties of individual objects, 
which are senses of unary predicates, have sets of individuals under 
concepts as denotations: a certain number of individuals under concepts 
possess them in each circumstance, Relations of degree 11 between 
individuals are senses of n-ary predicates where n _ 2. In thinking and 
speaking, we predicate relations of degree n in a certain order. We apply 
them successively to 11 objects of reference. The order of predication is 
expressed in language use by the syntaxical order in which referential 
expressions occur in atomic clauses. In thinking that Goliath is taller than 
David we predicate the relation of being taller first to David next to Goliath. 
Most binary relations between individuals are not symmetric. So these 
relations are satisfied by individuals under concepts in a certain order. 
Goliath is taller than David but David is not taller than Goliath. This is why 
attributes are said to be satisfied by sequences in the calculus of predicates 
(11). As Frege [1892] pointed out, the truth value of many propositions 
depends on the sense rather than the denotation of their prepositional 
constituents. Certain attributes of individuals are intensional: (hey are 
satisfied by sequences of individuals under some concepts without being 
satisfied by the same sequences of individuals under other concepts. Thus 
the relation of desire is intensional: Oedipus desired to marry Jocasta, (he 
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Queen of Thebes; but he did not desire to marry his mother. For that reason, 
denotations of attributes are sequences of individual concepts (or of 
individuals under concepts) rather than sequences of pure individuals in 
philosophical logic (12). There are however extensional attributes whose 
denotation only depends on the denotations of the concepts which satisfy 
them. So are the property of being tall and the relation of moving 
something. If Jocasta, the queen of Thebes is tall so is Oedipus' mother. 
Extensional attributes are satisfied by a sequence of individuals under 
concepts in a circumstance when they are satisfied by the sequence of 
individuals that fall under these concepts in that circumstance. For the sake 
of simplicity, I will often give examples of extensional attributes. 
3. Each type is a subtype of more general types. For any pair of types __ 
and _ of entities of the universe of discourse, there is the derived type _[_ of 
all entities which are of the type _ or By definition, the set U_[_ of 
entities of type [ is the union U__ [ U_ of the set U_ of entities of type . .. 
and of the set U_ of entities of type _. Thus concepts and attributes have the 
more general type of propositional constituents (13). For example, с [ r is 
the type of propositional constituents of first order propositions about 
individual objects (14). As in intensional logic, the set of types of entities is 
closed under the following two other operations: 
4. For any pair of types _ and there is the derived type ( ) of 
functions from the set of all entities of type _ into the set of all entities of 
type _. By definition, the set U of entities of type ( ) is the set of 
functions U_ ! U_. Thus (tt) is the type of unary truth functions and t(tt) that 
of binary truth functions, (et) is the type of (characteristic function of) sets 
of individuals and e(et) that of sets of pairs of individuals. As usual, sets of 
n-ary sequences of entities of the type _ are of the type (_(. . . (_t) . . . )) 
with n left and n right parentheses. 
5. Finally, for any type _ of entities, there is the derived type #_ of 
intensions whose extensions are entities of type _. An intension (15) of type 
#_ is a function from the set Circumstances of all possible circumstances 
into the set of entities of type _. Thus the set U#_ of entities of type #_ is 
the set of functions Circumstances ! U_.For example, Carnapian truth 
conditions are intensions of type #t: they are functions which associate with 
any possible circumstance a single truth value. All types of first order senses 
and denotations of the universe of discourse can be obtained from the few 
primitive types named above by applying the three operations on types that 
I have defined. From Carnap we know that each sense to which correspond 
entities of type 6 _ has a characteristic intension of type #_, namely the 
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function which associates with any possible circumstance the actual entity 
which is the denotation of that sense in that very circumstance. So any 
proposition has its characteristic Carnapian truth conditions which associate 
with each possible circumstance the true if and only if that proposition is 
true in that circumstance. Unfortunately traditional intensional logic has 
tended to identify senses with their characteristic intension. So propositions 
are reduced to truth conditions: their type p is #t in the modal logic of 
Carnap, Prior, Montague, Kaplan, Kripke, Belnap and most other logicians. 
Strictly equivalent propositions, which are true in the same possible 
circumstances, are then identified. There is only one necessarily true 
proposition as well as only one necessarily false proposition according to 
current philosophical logic. However, it is clear that most strictly equivalent 
propositions do not have the same cognitive values. In particular, they are 
not substitutable salva felicitate within the scope of illocutionary forces and 
psychological modes. For example, one can assert (and believe) that a big 
city is a city without asserting (or believing) eo ipso that p2 is an irrational 
number, even if these two assertions (and beliefs) are both true in all 
possible circumstances. Philosophy of language and mind requires a much 
finer logic of sense. Just as the same denotation can correspond to di._erent 
senses, the same intension can be common to di_erent senses in the deep 
logical structure of language. 
2. THE LOGICAL FORM OF PROPOSITIONS 
In order to seriously take into account the fact that propositions are 
always expressed in the attempted performance of illocutionary acts, I have 
advocated in Meaning and Speech Acts and other papers (16) a natural 
predicative logic of propositions. My main idea was to explicate the logical 
type of proposition by mainly taking into consideration the acts of 
predication that we make in expressing and understanding propositions. My 
propositional logic according to predication is based on the following 
principles: 
2.1. Propositional constituents are senses and not pure denotations 
As Frege [1892] pointed out, we cannot refer to objects without 
subsuming them under senses and without predicating of them attributes. 
Thus referential and predicative expressions of sentences have a sense in 
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addition to a possible denotation in each possible context of utterance. 
When we speak literally, we conceive the concepts and attributes which are 
the senses of the referential and predicative expressions that we use. 
Moreover we refer to the objects which fall under these concepts in the 
context of utterance. Frege's argument against direct reference is valid if 
propositions are contents of thought. Otherwise, we would be totally 
inconsistent. We can make mistakes and assert, for example, that Hesperus 
is not Phosphorus (17). But we never intend to make the absurd assertion 
that Hesperus is not Hesperus. Consequently, there are no singular 
propositions whose constituents are pure individual objects in my formal 
ontology, contrary to what Russell and others advocate in defending direct 
reference or external ism. All our objects of reference are objects under 
concepts. 
2.2. Propositions have a structure of constituents 
In speaking and thinking conceptually, we always predicate in a certain 
order attributes of our objects of reference. Just as any clause of an 
elementary sentence is composed from one or several atomic clauses where 
predicates of degree n are. syntactically combined in a certain order with a 
number n of complete referential expressions, each prepositional content 
that we have in mind is composed from one or several atomic propositions 
whose expression consists in an. act of predication. To express an atomic 
proposition is just to predicate in a certain order an attribute of degree n of 
n individual objects under concepts (18). So each atomic proposition has a 
number n+1 of propositional constituents. It contains a main attribute of 
individuals Rn of degree n and n individual concepts ulc , .. ., unc. And it is 
true in a circumstance when the sequence corresponding to the order of 
predication of its n individuals under concepts belongs to the actual 
denotation of its attribute in that circumstance. The order of predication is 
important only when it changes the truth conditions. The relation of identity 
is by nature symmetric. So the order in which we predicate the relation of 
identity of two entities is not important. We express the same atomic 
proposition in thinking that the morning star is the evening star and in 
thinking that the evening star is the morning star. On the contrary, the 
relation of admiration is not symmetric. A person can admire someone 
without being admired by him or her. So we express di_erent atomic 
propositions when we predicate in a di_erent order the relation of 
admiration of two objects of reference. We do not think that Napoleon 
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admires Chime when we ihink that Chirac admires Napoleon. Atomic 
propositions me identical when (hey have the same propositional 
i nir.lilurni!. ;iiul they шс line ш the same possible circumstances. So atomic 
pioposilions иге ol the type а ((с | r)t)((#t)t). Each atomic proposition ua 
is а pair whose first term idl(ua) is a finite non empty set of propositional 
constituents and whose second term id2(ua) is a set of possible 
circumstances. And the set Ua of atomic propositions is a special proper 
subset of the set (P(Attributes) [ P(Concepts)) x P(Circumstances) in my 
logic of sense. Elementary propositions like the proposition that the actual 
pope speaks Russian are composed from a single atomic proposition. 
Complex propositions like the proposition that the actual pope is Polish and 
speaks Russian are composed from several atomic propositions. I will say 
that two propositions have the same structure of constituents when they are 
composed from the same atomic propositions. In order to be identical two 
propositions must have the same structure of constituents. 
2.3. An adequate explication of truth conditions must take into account 
the elective way in which we understand such conditions 
To understand the truth conditions of an elementary proposition is not 
to know the actual truth value of its single atomic proposition in each 
possible circumstance. We understand the elementary proposition that the 
biggest whale is a fish without knowing eo ipso that it is necessarily false. 
We discovered in the course of history that whales are mammals. We 
understand expressed elementary propositions without knowing whether 
they are true or not in the context of utterance. Consider elementary 
propositions of the simplest kind which predicate an extensional property of 
an individual under concept. In understanding such elementary propositions 
we just understand that they are true in all (and only) the circumstances 
where the individual which falls under their concept possesses their 
characteristic property. We in general do not know by virtue of competence 
actual denotations of prepositional constituents in the context of utterance. 
We often refer to an object under a concept without being able to identify 
the object falling under that concept. Someone who says that Julie's 
murderer is wounded can just refer to whoever in the world is her murderer. 
Our knowledge of the world is not only partial. Some of our beliefs are 
false. We can wrongly believe that objects of reference possess a certain 
property. So we can refer to objects which do not fall under the concept that 
we have in mind (19). Furthermore, the objects to which we refer can 
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possess predicated properties in many di_erent ways. Julie's murderer could 
be wounded in various places. From a cognitive point of view, dLerent 
possible denotations could then correspond according to us to an expressed 
attribute or concept in each circumstance. In apprehending propositional 
constituents we rarely identify their actual denotations. We just presuppose 
that they have one in each circumstance. However we are able to consider 
by virtue of competence possible denotations that these senses could have in 
each circumstance. We might ignore who is Julie's murderer and not be sure 
that her murderer is wounded at a moment of utterance. But we can at least 
think of various people who could have murdered Julie and who could be 
wounded at that moment. Any speaker who conceives propositional 
constituents can in principle assign to them possible denotations of the 
appropriate type in the circumstances that he or she considers. Our possible 
assignments of a denotation to propositional constituents associate a single 
individual (or no individual at all) with each concept and a unique set of 
individuals under concepts with each property in each possible 
circumstance. Let us give a few examples. According to a first possible 
denotation assignment, my friend Paul would be Julie's murderer and he 
would also be wounded at the moment m according to history h. According 
to a second one, the chief of police, Julius, would be Julie's murderer but he 
would not be wounded at all in the circumstance m/h. According to a third 
one, nobody would be Julie's murderer but Paul, Julius and other people 
would be wounded in m/h, and so on. We clearly do not know a priori 
which possible assignments of a denotation to such senses match the reality. 
But we are at least capable by virtue of competence of distinguishing 
denotation assignments according to which an atomic proposition is true 
from denotation assignments according to which it is false. Thus we know 
that the atomic proposition that Julie's murderer is wounded is true in the 
circumstance m/h according to the first possible assignment considered 
above and that it is false in that circumstance according to the two others. 
Most atomic propositions have a lot of possible truth conditions in our 
interpretations: they could be true according to us in a lot of di_erent sets of 
possible circumstances given the various denotations that their propositional 
constituents could have in circumstances. From a logical point of view, 
there are as many possible truth conditions for an atomic proposition as 
there are di_erent sets of possible circumstances where that proposition 
could be true. Possible truth conditions are of the type #t. An atomic 
proposition could be true in a possible circumstance according to an agent 
when it is true in that circumstance according to at least one way that agent 
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could assign a denotation to its prepositional constituents. Any agent who 
takes into consideration a number n of di_erent possible circumstances can 
in principle assign 2n di_erent possible truth conditions to atomic 
propositions in his or her interpretation. Among all possible truth conditions 
for an atomic proposition ua, there are of course its actual Carnapian truth 
conditions to which correspond the set of possible circumstances id2(ua) 
where it is true. Many atomic propositions are logically related. If Paul is 
Julie's husband and Julie's husband is taller than Jim, then Paul is taller 
than Jim. The first two atomic propositions could not be true in a 
circumstance unless the third one is also true in that very circumstance. 
Possible truth conditions of atomic propositions are logically related. So our 
possible interpretations respect meaning postulates of a logical nature in 
assigning possible denotations to propositional constituents in 
circumstances. Our possible valuations of senses assign to atomic 
propositions possible truth conditions that they all could have together. 
From a logical point of view, possible valuations of senses are functions 
assigning to concepts and attributes denotations of the appropriate type in 
possible circumstances. By definition, val(uc) m/h 2 Individuals when an 
individual object falls under the individual concept uc according to the 
possible valuation val. Otherwise, val(uc) m/h = ? (20). And val (Rn)m/h 2 
P(Conceptsn) for any attribute Rn of degree n. So the set V alc[r of possible 
valuations of propositional constituents is a proper subset of the set 
(Concepts ! (Circumstances ! Individuals [ {?})) [ (Attributes ! 
(Circumstances ! S l_n P(Conceptsn)). Among all possible valuations of 
propositional constituents there is of course the real valuation (in symbols 
val*) which associates with concepts and attributes their actual denotation 
in each possible circumstance. Thus val _(uc)m/h is the object which really 
falls under'individual concept uc (in case there is one) and val _(Rn)m/h the 
sequence of objects under concepts which really satisfy attribute Rn in the 
circumstance m/h. We, human agents, are not aware of actual denotations of 
most senses in most circumstances. So our possible valuations of senses can 
associate a non actual denotation to many propositional constituents in 
many circumstances. A possible valuation val 2 Val is a real valuation of an 
individual concept uc and of an attribute Rn when, for any circumstance 
m/h , val (uc) = val_(uc)m, h and val (Rn)m/h = val_(Rn)m/h. By definition 
possible valuations of senses respect meaning postulates for logical 
attributes and operations on attributes that are imposed by their logical 
form. We all know by virtue of competence that individuals that we 
subsume under di_erent concepts are identical in a circumstance when these 
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concepts apply to the same individual in that circumstance. So all possible 
valuations val assign the same denotation to the identity relation = between 
individuals which is a logical universal. According to any interpretation a 
pair of individuals under concepts u lc , u2c 2 val(=)m/h if and only if 
val(ulc)m/h = val(u2c)m/h. Individual concepts have internal properties. So 
any object of reference which falls according to a valuation under certain 
concepts (e.g. the concept of being Oedipus' mother) in a circumstance 
possesses according to that valuation essential properties (e.g. to be a 
woman) in all circumstances where it is existent. So certain atomic 
propositions (e.g. that Oedipus'mother is male) are contradictory: they are 
false in all circumstances according to every possible valuation of an 
interpretation. Furthermore, objects of reference which possess certain 
properties (e.g. to be fallible) in a circumstance according to certain 
valuations must have other properties (e.g. to make a mistake) in the same 
or other possible circumstances. As one can expect, each possible valuation 
of prepositional constituents associates particular possible truth conditions 
with all atomic propositions containing these constituents. By virtue of its 
logical form, an atomic proposition Rn(ulc, ..., unc) predicating an 
attribute Rn of n individuals under concepts ulc, ..., unc in that order is true 
according to a valuation val in a circumstance m/h if and only if <ulc, ..., 
unc > 2 val (Rn)m/h (21). So to each possible valuation of propositional 
constituents corresponds a unique possible valuation associating with all 
atomic propositions possible truth conditions that they could all have 
together. Possible valuations val of atomic propositions are of the type a#t. 
They belong to a proper subset Vala of the set of functions Ua ! 
PCircumstances. Each possible valuation of atomic propositions val+ 2 V 
ala is the extension of a possible valuation of senses val 2 V alc[r such that 
m/h 2 val+(Rn((ulc, unc)) if and only if <ulc, ..., unc > 2 val (Rn) m/h. 
Consequently, the distinguished real valuation of senses val*, which assigns 
to all attributes and concepts their actual denotation in each circumstance, 
determines the real valuation val*+ of atomic propositions that associates 
with each of them its actual Carnapian truth conditions in the reality. By 
definition, an atomic proposition ua is true at a moment m according to a 
history h if and only if m/h 2val*+(ua). For val*+(ua) is by definition 
id2(ua). We a priori know actual truth values of few propositions, just as we 
a priori know the actual denotations of few propositional constituents. 
Firstly, there are few tautological (or contradictory) atomic propositions that 
we a priori know to be necessarily true (or false) by virtue of competence. 
In my terminology, tautological atomic propositions predicate of a sequence 
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of objects of reference an attribute that we a priori know that they satisfy 
(e.g. that Platon's mother is a woman) given the logical form of these 
concepts and of that attribute. Their only possible truth condition in our 
mind is then the set of all possible circumstances. On the contrary, 
contradictory atomic propositions predicate of a sequence of objects of 
reference an attribute that we a priori know that they do not satisfy (e.g. that 
Platon is di_erent from himself) Their only possible truth condition in our 
interpretations is the empty set of all possible circumstances. Elementary 
propositions containing a tautological (or contradictory) atomic proposition 
are exceptions. They are necessarily and analytically true (or false). Most 
elementary propositions are contingently, a posteriori and synthetically true 
or false. We need to observe the world in order to know whether they are 
true or false. Moreover, the truth of most complex propositions containing 
several atomic propositions is compatible with various possible ways in 
which objects could be. Think of disjunctions, past and future, propositions, 
historic possibilities, etc. Consider the past proposition that the pope was 
sick. In order that it be true in a given circumstance, it is su_cient that the 
pope be sick in at least one previous circumstance. So the truth of that past 
proposition in any circumstance с is compatible with a lot of possible truth 
conditions of the atomic proposition attributing to the pope the property of 
being sick (22). When a proposition contains several atomic propositions, 
its truth in a circumstance is compatible with certain possible valuations of 
its atomic propositions and incompatible with all others (23). We can ignore 
actual truth conditions. But we always distinguish, when we have a 
prepositional content in mind, the possible valuations of its atomic 
propositions which are compatible with its truth in a possible circumstance, 
from those which are not. In making such a distinction our mind draws a 
kind of truth table. Thus we know that the truth of an elementary 
proposition in any circumstance is compatible with all and only the possible 
valuations of its single atomic proposition according to which it is true in 
that very circumstance. We know that: the truth of a propositional negation 
->P in a circumstance is compatible with all and only the possible valuations 
of its atomic propositions which are incompatible with the truth of P in that 
circumstance. And that the truth of the modal proposition that it is 
universally necessary that P is compatible with all and only the possible 
valuations of its atomic propositions which are compatible with the truth of 
P in every possible circumstance. So the type of truth conditions of 
complete propositions is #((a#t)t) in my logic of sense. U#(a#t)t = 
(Circumstances ! P(Ua ! P(Circumstances). As Wittgenstein pointed out in 
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the Tractatus, there are two limit cases of truth conditions. Sometimes the 
truth of a proposition is compatible with all possible ways in which objects 
could be. It is a tautology. Sometimes it is incompatible with all of them. It 
is a contradiction. In my approach, a tautology is a proposition whose truth 
in any circumstance is compatible with all the possible truth conditions of 
its atomic propositions. And a contradiction a proposition whose truth is 
compatible with none. By virtue of their logical form, tautologies are then 
true according to all possible valuations of atomic propositions and 
contradictions according to none. Thus tautologies are a particular case of 
necessarily true propositions just as contradictions are a particular case of 
necessarily false propositions. Unlike what is the case for other necessarily 
true or necessarily false propositions, we a priori know that tautologies are 
necessarily true and that contradictions are necessarily false when we 
apprehend their logical form. Tautologyhood and contradiction are 
episteinic as well as logical and metaphysical notions. 
2.4. 'The new criterion of propositional identity 
Identical propositions have the same structure of constituents and their 
truth in each circumstance is compatible with the same possible truth 
conditions of their atomic propositions. The type p of propositions is 
(at)(#((a#t)t)t). Thus the set Up of propositions is included in the set PUa x 
(Circumstances ! P(Ua ! PCircumstances). From a logical point of view, 
each proposition P has a characteristic finite set of atomic propositions (in 
symbols id IP) and a characteristic intension (in symbols id2P) which 
associates with any possible circumstance the set of possible valuations of 
its atomic propositions which are compatible with its truth in that very 
circumstance. My criterion of prepositional identity is stronger than that of 
modal, temporal, intensional and relevance logics. Strictly equivalent 
propositions composed out of di_erent atomic propositions are no longer 
identified. We do not make the same predications in expressing them. So 
the propositions that the morning star is the morning star and that the 
evening star is the evening star are di_erent tautologies. Their propositional 
constituents are di_erent. Furthermore, unlike Parry (24) I do not identify 
all strictly equivalent propositions with the same structure of constituents. 
Consider the elementary proposition that the biggest whale is a fish and the 
contradiction that the biggest whale is and is not a fish. They are both 
necessarily false and contain the same single atomic proposition. But they 
do not have the same cognitive value. We can believe that whales are fishes. 
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But we could not believe that whales are and are not fishes. In my logic, 
such propositions are d i e ren t because their truth is not compatible with the 
same possible truth condit ions of their atomic proposition (25). However, as 
we will see later, my criterion of propositional identity is less rigid than that 
of intensional isomorphism in Cresswell's hyperintensional logic (26). For 
all Boolean laws of idempotence, commutativity, distributivitv and 
associativity of truth functions remain valid laws of propositional identity. 
2.5. The set of propositions is recursive 
Elementary propositions are the simplest propositions. They contain a 
single atomic proposition and are true in all circumstances where that 
atomic proposition is true (27). All other propositions are more complex: 
they are obtained by applying to simpler propositions operations which 
change their structure of constituents or truth conditions. Truth functions are 
the simplest propositional operations. Complex propositions composed by 
truth functions have all and only the atomic propositions of their arguments. 
And their truth value in a circumstance only depends on the truth values of 
their arguments in that very circumstance. Thus the conjunction P л Q and 
the disjunction P _ Q of two propositions have the atomic propositions of 
their arguments P and Q. They only di._er by their truth conditions (28). 
Unlike truth functions, quantification, modal and temporal operations on 
propositions change the structure of constituents as well as truth conditions. 
When we think that all objects are such that God has knowledge of them, 
we predicate of Him the properly of omniscience, namely that He knows 
everything. Such a generalized proposition contains a new atomic 
proposition predicating a generalization of the attribute of its argument. It is 
moreover true in a circumstance when that new atomic proposition is true in 
that circumstance (29). Modal and temporal operations also change the 
structure of constituents. They add new atomic propositions. When we think 
that it is universally necessary that God does not make mistakes, we do 
more than attribute to God the property of not making mistakes. We also 
attribute to Him the modal property of infallibility, namely that He does not 
make mistakes in any possible circumstance. The property of infallibility is 
the necessitation of the property of not making mistakes. Modal 
propositions according to which it is necessary that things are such and such 
contain new atomic propositions predicating the necessitation of attributes 
of their argument. Unlike quantification, modal and temporal operations are 
however intensional: the truth value of a modal or temporal proposition in a 
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circumstance depends on the truth values of its argument in other possible 
circumstances. Thus the truth in a circumstance of the temporal proposition 
that it has always been the case that P is compatible with all possible 
valuations of its atomic propositions which are compatible with the truth of 
P in all anterior circumstances. 
3. TRUTH ACCORDING TO PREDICATION 
Thanks to the new explication of the logical type of proposition, my 
logic of sense and denotation o_ers a new concise definition of truth by 
correspondence and articulates better the logical structure of propositions. 
In the philosophical tradition, from Aristotle to Tarski, truth is based on 
correspondence with reality: true propositions correspond to existing facts. 
Objects of reference have properties and stand in relations in actual and 
possible circumstances. Atomic propositions have therefore a well 
determined truth value in each circumstance depending on the actual 
denotation of their attributes and concepts and the order of predication. 
Moments of time represent possible complete states of the actual world at 
an instant in the logic of ramified time and action. The past is unique but the 
future is open. We, human agents, live in an indctcrminist world. So various 
alternative incompatible moments could directly follow a moment (30). 
Actual moments of time some represent actual complete states of the world. 
The present moment, which represents "all nature now" (as Whitehead 
says), is actual as well as all moments which are anterior to it. These 
moments belong to the actual course of history of this world. Atomic 
propositions which are true at a moment (or time interval) in the actual 
course of history of the world represent facts (states of a_airs, events or 
actions) which exist or happen at some instant (or time interval) in the 
actual world. As Wittgenstein noticed at the beginning of the Tractatus, 
"The world divides into facts" (1.2) not into objects. Because of 
indeterminism, there are a lot of possible historic continuations of the 
present moment. We ignore which of them will turn to be actual. We can 
just assume that there is a single one (if the world continues). Many possible 
circumstances that we consider belong to a possible non actual course of 
history of the world. Such non actual circumstances are however possible. 
They belong to what I will call the logical space of reality. Propositions 
which are true in possible circumstances represent possible facts that would 
exist if the possible course of history to which they belong were actual. The 
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world is part of reality. So in order to describe the real world and represent 
existing facts (for example, that certain objects are soluble) in actual 
circumstances, we need to consider facts happening in other circumstances 
which are just possible. A material object of this world is soluble now if and 
only if it would dissolve if it were put in water. However things could have 
many other properties and stand in many other relations according to us in 
possible circumstances (whether actual or not). In addition to the ways in 
which things are in reality, there are the possible ways in which we can 
think that they could be. We do not know how the world has been until now 
and how it will continue. We even ignore most of what is the case now at 
the present moment. So, as I explained above, we consider a lot of possible 
truth conditions of atomic propositions di_erent from their actual truth 
conditions in thinking and speaking. In our mind, the truth of propositions is 
compatible with many possible ways in which we can represent objects. 
However, in order that a proposition be true in a possible circumstance, 
things must be in that circumstance as that proposition represents them. 
Otherwise, there would be no correspondence with reality. Along these 
lines, I propose to define as follows the concept of truth: a proposition is 
true in a circumstance when its truth in that circumstance is compatible with 
valuations that assign actual truth conditions to all its atomic propositions. 
For short, a proposition P is true in a circumstance m/h when a possible 
valuation val+ 2 id2P(m/h) is such that val+(ua) = id2(ua) for all atomic 
propositions ua 2 id IP. As one can expect, the truth of the proposition P in 
that circumstance is then compatible with all the real valuations of its 
propositional constituents. In particular any true proposition P is true 
according to the real valuation val*+ of atomic propositions. Classical laws 
of truth theory follow from this concise definition (31). 
3.1. Cognitive aspects in the theory of truth 
A speaker a often rightly or wrongly believes at a moment m that 
certain propositional constituents could only have such and such possible 
denotations in circumstances. In that case, atomic propositions composed 
from such constituents could only be true according to him or her at that 
moment in such and such sets of possible circumstances. A particular set 
Val (a,m) of possible valuations of atomic propositions is then compatible 
with what the speaker a believes at the moment m. Any speaker having in 
mind atomic propositions believes in the truth of certain propositions 
containing them. One can define exactly the notion of truth according to a 
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speaker in my logic of sense: A proposition is true in a circumstance rn/h 
according to a speaker a at a moment m when the truth of that proposition in 
that circumstance is compatible with all possible valuations assigned by that 
agent at that moment to its propositional constituents i.e. when Val (a,m) _ 
id2P(m/h). By hypothesis, tautological propositions are true and 
contradictory propositions are false according to all agents who have them 
in mind. But impossible propositions which are not contradictory can be 
true and necessarily true propositions which are not tautological can be false 
according to agents at some moments. These are basic principles of my 
epistemic logic. So the logic of language impose di_erent limits to reality 
and thought. On one hand, all propositions which are false in all possible 
circumstances represent impossible facts that could not exist in reality. (I do 
not advocate the need in formal semantics of impossible circumstances 
where such impossible facts could exist.) On the other hand, I admit that 
there are necessarily false propositions that we can believe (e.g. that whales 
are fishes). So we can represent impossible facts and wrongly think that 
they exist. Among necessarily false propositions, I distinguish then those 
that we can believe from others that we cannot (the pure contradictions). All 
depends whether their truth is compatible or not with some valuations of 
their atomic propositions. 
The notion of strong implicat ion 
Human beings are not perfectly rational. We are often inconsistent. 
Furthermore, we do not make all valid inferences. We assert (and believe) 
propositions without asserting (and believing) all their logical 
consequences. Thus, our illocutionary (and psychological) commitments are 
not as strong as they should be from the logical point of view. However, we, 
human agents, are not totally irrational. On the contrary, we manifest a 
minimal rationality (32) in thinking and speaking. When we know by virtue 
of competence that a proposition is false we never relate it to the world with 
the intention of achieving a success of fit between words and things. So we 
do not attempt to perform unsatisfiable illocutionary acts with a non empty 
direction of fit and a contradictory propositional content. Such acts are 
imperformable because we a priori know that they cannot be satisfied. 
Moreover, when we a priori know by virtue of competence that a 
proposition cannot be true unless another is also true, we cannot assert (or 
believe) that proposition without asserting (or believing) the second. There 
is in philosophical logic an important relation of strict implication between 
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propositions that is due to C.l. Lewis. By definition, a proposition strictly 
implies another proposition whenever that other proposition is true in all 
possible circumstances where it is true. Hintikka (33) and others have 
advocated that belief and knowledge are closed under strict implication. 
However, from a cognitive point of view, we ignore how propositions are 
related by strict implication, just as we ignore in which possible 
circumstances they are true. Any proposition strictly implies infinitely many 
necessarily true propositions. However we could not assert (or believe) all 
of them in any circumstance. We need a relation of implication much finer 
than strict implication in order to explicate existing illocutionary and 
psychological commitments. Thanks to the predicative analysis of the 
logical form of propositions, one can define a relation of implication called 
strong implication that is finer than all others. A proposition strongly 
implies another proposition when firstly, it contains all its atomic 
propositions and secondly, all possible valuations of atomic propositions 
which are compatible with its truth in a circumstance are also compatible 
with the truth of that other proposition in that very circumstance. In other 
words, P strongly implies Q (in symbols P 7! Q) when id IP __ id2Q and, for 
any circumstance m/h, idlP(m/h) _ id2Q(m/h). Unlike strict implication, 
strong implication is cognitive. Whenever a proposition P strongly implies 
another proposition Q we cannot apprehend that proposition P without 
knowing a priori that it strictly implies the other Q. For in apprehending P, 
we have by hypothesis in mind all atomic propositions of Q. We make all 
the corresponding acts of reference and predication. Furthermore, in 
understanding the truth conditions of proposition P, we consider all possible 
valuations of these atomic propositions which are compatible with its truth 
in any circumstance m/h. The same possible valuations of atomic 
propositions of Q which are in P are then by hypothesis compatible with the 
truth of proposition Q in that circumstance m/h. Thus, in expressing P, we 
know that Q follows from P when P strongly implies Q. According to my 
epistemic logic, belief and knowledge are then closed under strong rather 
than strict implication. As I will show, strong implication obeys a series of 
important universal laws. Unlike strict implication, strong implication is 
anti-symmetrical. Two propositions which strongly imply each other are 
identical. Unlike Parry's analytic implication, strong implication is always 
tautological. In my terminology, a proposition P tautologically implies 
another Q when, for any circumstance m/h, idlP(m/h) _ id2Q(m/h). Natural 
deduction rules of elimination and introduction generate strong implication 
when and only when all atomic propositions of the conclusion belong to the 
30 
premises. So a proposition P does not strongly imply any disjunction of the 
form P _ Q. Moreover strong implication is paraconsistent. A contradiction 
does not strongly imply all propositions. Finally, strong implication is finite 
and decidable. (More on this later.) 
4. ANALYSIS OF MODAL AND TEMPORAL PROPOSITIONS 
Let us now analyze in terms of predication the logical form of modal 
and temporal propositions in the framework of the logic of ramified time. 
We need to take into account the following facts: 
1. As regards their structure of constituents 
Unlike truth functions, modal and temporal operations on propositions 
enrich the set of their atomic propositions. As I said earlier, we predicate 
modal and temporal attributes in expressing modal and temporal 
propositions. For example, in asserting that Paul was previously married to 
Julie we predicate of Paul the temporal property of being an ex-husband of 
Julie. 
2. As regards their truth conditions 
As Occam already pointed out, in order to analyze the truth conditions 
of future propositions we need to consider not only moments of time but 
also histories. In the logic of branching time, a moment is a possible 
complete state of the world at a certain instant and the temporal relation of 
anteriority / posteriority between moments is partial rather than linear 
because of indeterminism. On the one hand, there is a single causal route to 
the past: each moment m is preceded by at most one past moment m'. And 
all moments are historically connected: any two distinct moments have a 
common historical ancestor in their past. On the other hand, there are 
multiple future routes: several incompatible moments might follow upon a 
given moment. For facts existing at a moment can have incompatible future 
e_ects. Consequently, the set of moments of time in any interpretation has 
the formal structure of a tree-like frame which can be represented as 
follows: 
A maximal chain h of moments of time is called a history. It represents 
a possible course of history of the actual world. There are nine di_erent 
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histories in the preceding figure. A first history hi goes from moment mO to 
moment m7, a second one h2 from moment mO to moment m8, and so on. 
The truth of certain propositions is settled at each moment no matter which 
historical continuation of that moment is under consideration. So are past 
propositions because all histories through a moment have the same past at 
that moment. The past proposition that it was the case that A (in symbols: 
WasA) is true at a moment m according to any history when A is true at a 
moment m' anterior to m. Thanks to histories, branching temporal logic can 
analyze the notion of seltled truth. The proposition that it is settled that A 
(in symbols SettledA) is true at a moment m according to a history h if and 
only if the proposition lhat A is true at that moment m according to all 
histories to which it belongs. Unlike what is the case for past propositions, 
the truth of future propositions is not settled at each moment; it depends on 
which historical continuation h of that moment is under consideration. 
Following Peirce and Belnap [1994] I will say that the future proposition 
that it will be the case that A (in symbols WillA) is true at a moment m 
according to a history h when the proposition that A is true at a moment m' 
posterior to m according to that very history h (34). Given the causal 
ordering relation, some histories h and h' are undivided at certain moments 
m; they have the same present and past at these moments. In that case, 
moment m and all moments m' anterior to that moment belong to both 
histories h and h'. The relation of having the same present and past at a 
moment m is an equivalence relation which partitions the set of histories to 
which m belongs into a family of exhaustive and pairwise disjoint subsets, 
each of which keeps undivided histories at the next moment together. Each 
set of histories in the partition is an elementary immediate possibility after 
m. If there is only one such subset in the partition, the moment m is 
deterministic. Otherwise, it is undeterministic. Two moments of time are 
alternative in my terminology when they belong to histories which have the 
same past before these moments. For example, moments m7, m8 and m9 are 
alternative in the last figure. They represent how the world could be 
immediately after the moment rn3 (35). The set Instant of all instants is a 
partition of the set Time of all moments of time which contains exactly one 
moment of each history and respects the temporal order of histories. 
Moments which belong to the same instant are said to be coinstantaneous. 
So the first instant is the singleton containing the moment of time which is 
anterior to all others (such a first moment exists in an interpretation if the 
world has a beginning according to it). And after each instant _ the next 
instant is the set that contains all and only the alternative moments that 
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follow the moments of that instant For example, moments m3, m4, m5 
and m6 of figure 1 are coinstantaneous. Thanks to instants, branching logic 
can analyze important modal notions such as historic necessity (in the sense 
of now unpreventability) (36) and historic possibility. Consider the 
proposition that it is then necessary that A (in symbols _A) in the sense that 
it could not have been otherwise than A: it is true at a moment m according 
a history h when the proposition that A is true at all moments m' 
coinstantaneous with m according to the histories h' to which they belong. 
Whenever _A is true at a moment m, A represents a fact that is not only 
settled but also inevitable at that moment. Similarly, the proposition that it 
is then possible that A (in symbols _A) is true at a moment m according a 
history h when the proposition that A is true at some moment m' 
coinstantaneous with m according to at least one history h \ 
The ideal object language 
The ideal object propositional language L, of my logic of ramified time 
and historic modalities contains the following syntactic resources: 
Vocabulary of L 
Language L contains in its lexicon: 
(1) a series of propositional symbols p, p', p", ..., q, q ' , q " \ ... and 
(3) the syncategorematic expressions: 
Tautological, >, л , _, Will, Was, (and). 
Rules of formation of L 
The set Lp of propositional formulas. 
Propositional symbols are propositional formulas. If Ap and Bp are 
propositional formulas then -iAp, _Ap, WillAp, WasAp , Tautological(Ap), 
(Ap > Bp) and (Ар л Bp) are new complex prepositional formulas. 
Propositional symbols express propositions. 
A formula of the form - A p expresses the negation of the proposition 
expressed by Ap. 
_Ap expresses the modal proposition that Ap is then necessary (i.e. 
that it could not have been otherwise than Ap). 
WillAp expresses the future proposition that it will be the case that Ap. 
WasAp expresses the past proposition that it has been the case that Ap. 
Tautological(Ap) expresses the proposition that Ap is tautological. 
(Ap > Bp) expresses the proposition that all atomic propositions of Bp 
are atomic propositions of Ap. 
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(Ар л Bp) expresses the conjunction of the two propositions expressed 
by Ap and Bp. 
Rules of abbreviation 
Exterior parentheses will often be omitted. Parentheses will also be 
omitted according to the rule of the association to the left. Truth, modal and 
temporal connectives are introduced according to usual rules. 
Disjunction: (Ap _ Bp) =df- i ( -Ap л -•Bp) whenever A and В 2 L.p 
Material implication: (Ap ) Bp) =df ->(Ap л -•Bp) 
Material equivalence: (Ap, Bp) =df (Ap) Bp) л (Bp ) Ap) 
Was-always Ap =df ->Was-iAp 
Will-alwaysAp =df - iWilbAp 
AlwaysAp =df Was-always Ар л Ар л Will-alwaysAp 
SometimesAp = WasAp_ Ap _ Will Ap 
Historical possibility: _Ap =df-i_-iAp 
Universal necessity: _Ap =df Always _Ap 
Universal possibility: _Ap =df -1_лАр 
Strict implication: Ap —2 Bp =df_ (Ap ) Bp) 
Here are new abbreviations: 
Analytic implication (37): Ap ! Bp =df (Ap > Bp) л (Ap - 2 Bp) 
Strong implication: Ap 7!Bp=df (Ар >Вр)л Tautological(Ap )Bpi 
Same structure of constituents: Ap _ Bp =df (Ap > Bp) л (Bp > Ap) 
Propositional identity: Ap = Bp =df (Ap 7! Bp) л (Bp 7! Ap) 
5. THE FORMAL SEMANTICS 
One must interpret formulas of L and associate with them truth 
conditions according to the following rules. A standard model for L is a 
quintuple M of the form < Time, Instant, Atom, Val, kk >, where 
(1) Time is a non empty set whose elements m, m \ m"... are moments 
which represent possible complete states of the world. _ is a partial order on 
the set Time representing the causal ordering relation or the temporal 
relation of anteriority / posteriority, in < m' means that moment m is in the 
past of moment m' and that moment m' is in the future of possibilities of m. 
By definition, < is subject to historical connection and no downward 
branching. Any two distinct moments m and m' have a common historical 
ancestor: some moment m'" such that m" < m and m" < m'. Moreover, the 
past is unique: if there is a moment m" such that m < m" and m' < m" then 
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either m = m' or m < m' or m' < m. Consequently, (Time, =) is a tree-like 
frame. A maximal chain h of moments of Time is called a history. It 
represents a possible course of history of the world. Let History be the set of 
all histories. Two histories h and h' are undivided at a moment m when they 
have the same present and past at these moments, that is to say when, for all 
moments m' _ m, m' 2 h and m' 2 h'. 
(2) The set Instants, whose elements _, _ ' , ... are called instants, is a 
partition of the set Time which satisfies unique intersection and order 
preservation. So for all _ and h there is a unique moment m (in symbols 
m(_,h) belonging to _ and h. And m(_,h) _ m(_',h) when m(_,h') _ 
m(_',h').Two moments of time m and m' are coinstantaneous (in symbols: 
m _= m') when they belong to the same instant. Any pair of coinstantaneous 
moments m and m' represent two complete possible states of the world in 
which things could be at a certain instant. 
(.3) Atoms is an infinite set whose elements are atomic propositions. In 
the present logic, atomic propositions are left undefined. However, as I have 
explained earlier, one can define their formal nature using the modal theory 
of types. P[Atoms] is an upper modal temporal and agentive semi lattice 
containing finite sets of atomic propositions which is closed under union 
| and a unary modal and temporal operation * satisfying the following 
conditions: For any _a _ Atoms , _a _ *(_a) and for any _1 and _2 _ Atoms, 
*(_1 I _2) = *(_1) I *(_2) and **(_!) = *(_1) (38). All the elements of 
P(Atoms) are finite sets of atomic propositions from which expressible 
propositions can be composed. 
(4) Val is the set of all functions from Atoms intoP(Time x History). 
Its elements are valuations of atomic propositions. Each valuation val 2 Val 
assign possible truth conditions to atomic propositions, m, h 2 val(ua) 
means that atomic proposition ua is true at moment m according to history h 
under that valuation. When m,h 2 val(ua), m 2 h. I will often indicate this by 
writing m/h. There is a distinguished valuation valM 2 Val determining the 
actual truth conditions that atomic propositions have under the model M. 
So, for any atomic proposition ua, valM(ua) is the set of all pairs m/h of 
moments and histories where that atomic proposition is true according to 
the model M. 
(.5) The set Up of all propositions which are expressible in L according 
to M is an infinite subset of the Cartesian product P[Atoms] x P (Val) 
TimexHistory. The first term, [P], of a proposition P represents the set of its 
atomic propositions. And its second term, |P|, its truth conditions. So for 
each moment m and history h, where m 2 h, |P|m/h is the set containing all 
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possible valuations of atomic propositions which are compatible with the 
truth of proposition P at the moment m according to the history h. 
(6) kk is an interpreting function which associates with each 
prepositional formula the proposition that that formula expresses according 
to model M. The proposition kApk expressed by formula Ap 2 Lp in the 
model M is a pair < [Ap],|Ap| > belonging to the Cartesian product 
Pf Atoms] xP(Val)TimexHistory. 
PropositionkApkis defined inductively as follows: 
(i) For any propositional symbol p, kpk 2 Up. 
(ii) [TautologicalBp] = [Bp] and |TautologicalBp|m/h = Val when 
|Bp|m/h = Val. Otherwise, |TautologicalBp|m/h = ?. 
(iii) b B p ] = [Bp] and |--iBp|m/h = Val - |Bp|m/h. 
(iv) [_Bp] = *[Bp] and |_Bp|m/h = T mO/hO[|Bp|mO/hO where mO _= 
m). 
(v) [WillBp] = *[Bp] and |WillAp|m/h = S mO>m |Ap|mO/h. 
(vi) [WasBp] = *[Bp] and |WasAp|m/h = S mO<m |Ap|mO/h. 
(vii) [Bp л Cp] = [Bp] [ [Cp] and |Bp л Cp|m/h = |Bp|m/h \ |Cp|m/h. 
(viii) [Bp _ Cp] = [Bp] [ [Cpl and |Bp _ Cp|m/h = Val when [Bp] _ 
[Cp]. 
Otherwise |Bp _ Cp|m/h = ? (39). 
Definition of truth and validity 
A proposition kApk is true at a moment m according to a history h 
under the model M when the real valuation valM 2 |Ap|m/h. A formula Ap 
of L is valid or logically true (in symbols: |=Ap) when kApk is true at all 
moments according to all histories in all standard models M of L. 
6. A COMPLETE AXIOMATIC SYSTEM 
I conjecture that all and only the valid formulas of my logic are 
provable in the following axiomatic system S. The axioms of S are all the 
instances in L of the following axiom schemas : 
Classical truth functional logic 
(Tl) (Ap ) (Bp ) Ap)) 
(T2) ((Ap ) (Bp ) Cp))) ((Ap ) Bp) ) (Ap ) Cp))) 
(T3) ( ( - . A p ) - . B p ) ) ( B p ) A p ) ) 
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(T4) (_Ap ) Ap ) 
(T5) (_(Ap ) Bp) ) _(Ap ) _Bp)) 
(T6) (_Ap ) —Ap) 
Axioms for tautologies 
(Т7) (Tautological(Ap))) _ Ap 
(T8) (Tautological(Ap))) (Ap = (Ap ) Ap)) 
(T9) (-iTautological(Ap))) ((Tautological(Ap)) = (Ар A - A p ) ) 
(T10) Tautological(Ap)) (Tautological(Ap )Bp)) Tautological (Bp)) 
( T i l ) Tautological(Ap)) Tautological (_Ap) 
(T12-13) Tautological (Ap) ) Tautological (Will-alwaysAp) And 
similarly for Was-always 
(T14) (Ap = Bp) ) Tautological (С ) C*) where C* and С are 
preposi tional formulas which di_er at most by the fact that an occurrence of 
Bp replaces an occurrence of Ap. 
Axioms for propositional composition 
(CI) (Ap > Bp ) ) Tautological(Ap > Bp) 
(C2) -i(Ap > Bp ) ) Tautological-^Ap > Bp) 
(C3) Ap > Ap 
(C4) (Ap > Bp) ) ((Bp > Cp) ) (Ap > Cp)) 
(C5) (Ар л Bp) > Ap 
(C6) (Ар л Bp) > Bp 
(C7) (Cp > Ap) ) ((Cp > Bp) ) (Cp > (Ар л Bp))) 
(C8) Ap _ -.Ap 
(C:9) _Ap > Ap 
(CIO) _->Ap Ap 
(CI 1) _(Ap л Bp) _ (_Ap л _Bp) 
(CI 2) Ap Ap 
(C13) WillAp _ _ A p 
(CI4) WasAp _ _ A p 
B ranching time logic 
(TL1) (Will-always(Ap ) Bp) ) (Will-alwaysAp ) Will-alwaysBp)) 
(TL2) (Was-always(Ap ) Bp) ) (Was-alwaysAp ) Was-alwaysBp)) 
(TL3) (Ap ) Was-al ways WillAp) 
(TL4) (Ap ) Will-always WasAp) 
(TL7) (WasAp) Will-alwaysWasAp) 
(TL8) WillAp ) Will-aIways(WillAp _ Ap _ WasAp) 
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(TL9) WasAp ) Was-always(WillAp _ Ap _ WasAp) 
Historic modality with time 
(MT1) ( W a s j A p л Will-always Bp) л Was-alwaysi(Bp л _Cp)) ) 
„(Will-always Dp л WasCp ) Was(Ap л (Cp _ WasCp) л Willalways(Cp ) 
Will-always Dp))) 
(MT2) (Was-always(Ap л Was-alwaysJBp л _Ср)л Will (Bp л Ар л 
„Dp)) AWas(_Ep л Will-always Bp)) ) JWill-always Qp ) Was(Ep л Will-
always (Cp ) Will-always Dp ) Will-always Qp)))) (40) 
The rules of inference of axiomatic system S are: 
The rule of Modus Ponens: From the sentences (A ) B) and A infer B. 
The necessitation rules: From a theorem A infer TautologicalA. 
7. VALID LAWS 
7.1. Laws of composition 
A proposition is composed from all the atomic propositions of its 
constituent propositions. 
Thus |=Ap > p when p occurs in Ap. 
There is a law of distribution of the constituent atomic propositions of 
modal and temporal propositions with respect to truth functions. 
|=M(ApABp) _(MApAMBp) where M is of the form _,->_, 
WilH, Was,Was-i, -Will or -iWas. So all the di_erent modal and temporal 
propositions of the form MAp have the same atomic propositions. 
|=MAp _ M'Ap , where M and M' are -._, _ - I , - I _ - I , WilH, Was, 
Was- , -.Will or -.Was. 
7.2. Laws for tautologyhood 
There are modal, temporal as well as truth functional tautologies. 
Thus |= Tautological(_Ap ) Ap) and |= Tautological(Ap ) Willalways 
WasAp). 
Tautologyhood is stronger than logical necessity. 
Thus |= Tautological(Ap)) _Ap. 
But 2 __Ap ) Tautological(Ap). Necessarily true elementary 
propositions like the proposition that whales are mammals are not 
tautological. 
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7.3. Laws for tautological implication 
Tautological implication is finer than strict implication. 
|= Tautological(Ap ) Bp) ) (Ap - 2 Bp) But the converse is not true. 
For example, the elementary proposition that the biggest whale is a fish 
strictly implies the contradiction that it is and that it is not a fish. But it does 
not tautologically imply that contradiction. Only elementary propositions 
whose atomic proposition is it self contradictory tautologically imply a 
contradiction. Whenever a proposition tautologically implies another, we 
can express the first without expressing the second. (Suppose the second 
contains new atomic propositions.) But one cannot have both in mind 
without knowing that the first imply the second. 
7.4. Laws for strong implication 
Strong implication is the strongest kind of propositional implication. 
By definition, Ap 7! Bp = (Ap > Bp) л Tautological (Ap ) Bp) 
Whenever a proposition strongly implies another proposition, this is 
tautological. |=(Ap 7! Bp), Tautological (Ap 7! Bp). 
Any proposition implying strongly another proposition is identical with 
its conjunction with that other proposition. So |=(Ap 7! Bp),((Ap л Bp) = 
Ap) 
There are two causes of failure of strong implication: 
Firstly, |= ~>(Ap > Bp) ) -'(Ap 7! Bp). A proposition does not strongly 
imply any proposition composed from other atomic propositions: 
In that case, it is possible to have in mind the first proposition without 
having in mind the second. 
Secondly, |= -iTautological(Ap ) Bp) ) ->(Ap 7! Bp). A proposition 
does not strongly imply any proposition that it does not tautologically 
imply. In that case, we do not necessarily know by virtue of linguistic 
competence that the first proposition has more truth conditions than the 
second. Unlike strict implication, strong implication is a relation of partial 
order. So Parry's analytic implication, which is not anti-symmetric, is 
weaker than strong implication. |= (Ap 7! Bp) ) (Ap ! Bp). But 2(A ! В ) ) 
(A 7! В ). For 2(A ! B)) Tautological(A)B). 
Paradoxical laws of the following kind do not hold for strong 
implication: 
|= (Cp _ - _ p ) ! _p) _ Cp! C p л -VP)) 
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7.5. Natural deduction 
All and only the valid laws of inference of modal and temporal logic 
where the premises contain all atomic propositions of the conclusion are 
valid laws of strong implication. This leads to the following system of 
natural deduction for strong implication: 
The law of elimination of conjunction: 
|=(Ap л Bp ) 7! Ap and |=(Ap л Bp ) 7! Bp 
The law of elimination of disjunction: 
|=((Ap 7! Cp ) л (Bp 7! Cp ) ) ) (Ap _ Bp ) 7! Cp 
Failure of the law of introduction of disjunction: 2Ap 7! (Ap _ Bp) 
So strong implication is stronger than entailment in the sense of the 
logic of relevance. For the law of introduction of disjunction holds for 
entailment. 
Failure of the law of elimination of negation: 2(Ap л ~Ap) 7! Bp 
Strong implication is paraconsistent. 
The law of elimination of material implication: |=(Ap л (Ap )Bp)) 7! 
Bp 
The law of elimination of necessity: |= _Ap 7! Ap 
The law of elimination of always: |=AlwaysAp 7! Ap 
The law of introduction of necessity: |=(Ap 7! Bp ) ) (_Ap 7! _Bp) 
And similarly for Will ,Was. 
Failure of the law of elimination of possibility: 2 (_Ap 7!Bp) ) Ap 
7!Bp 
Failure of the law of introduction of possibility: 2Ap 7! _Ap For 2Ap > 
_Ap. And similarly for Sometimes. 
Strong implication is decidable. For |=Ap > Bp when all prepositional 
symbols which occur in В also occur in A. Moreover, |=Tautological(Ap ) 
Bp) when semantic tableaux for (Ap ) Bp) close (41). 
There is also a theorem of finiteness for strong implication: 
Every proposition only strongly implies a finite number of other 
propositions. In particular, a proposition strongly implies all and only the 
tautologies which are composed from its atomic propositions. 
|=Tautological Bp ) (Ap 7! Bp, Ap > Bp ) 
Similarly, a contradiction strongly implies all and only the propositions 
composed from its atomic propositions. |=Tautological -'Ap ) (Ap 7! Bp, 
(Ap > Bp)) The fact that knowledge is closed under strongimplication is 
confirmed by the decidability and finiteness of strong implication. 
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7.6. Laws of propositional identity 
Modal and temporal propositions are composed from several atomic 
propositions. So 2 (_Ap = p) for any propositional symbol p. And similarly 
for Will and Was. The failure of this law is shown in language use. 
Properties such as being identical with itself are possessed by all objects in 
all circumstances. They have the same extension as their necessitation. But 
when we think that Oedipus is identical with himself, we do not eo ipso 
Ihink that it is necessary that he be identical with himself. So modal 
propositions are not reducible to elementary propositions. All the classical 
Boolean laws of idempotence, commutativity and associativity remain 
valid: 
|=Ap =(Ap л Ap); 
j=(Ap л Bp)=(Bp л Ap) and |=(Ap л (Bp л Cp))=((Ap л Bp) л Cp)) 
As well as the laws of distributivity: 
|= -.(Ap _ Bp ) = ( -Ар л —Bp ); 
|=Ap л (Bp _ Cp )) = (Ар л Bp) _ (Ар л Cp )); 
|= _(Ap л Bp ) = (_Ap л _Bp) 
And the laws of reduction: 
|= —Ap = Ap and |=M_Ap = _Ap and |=M_Ap = _Ap where M = _, 
_->, _ or _-. In particular, |= _Ap = Ap 
Identical propositions need not be intensionally isomorphic in the 
sense of hyperintensional logic (42). As I have argued in [1990-1991], 
intensional isomorphism is a too strong criterion of propositional identity. 
However, propositional identity requires more than co-entailment in the 
sense of the logic of relevance. For 2A 7! (А л (A _ В). M. Dunn (43) 
regrets that A and (А л (A _ В ) co-entail each other. For most formulas of 
such forms are not synonymous. Co-entailment is not su_cient for 
synonymy because it allows for the introduction of new senses. Strong 
equivalence which requires the same structure of constituents is necessary 
for an adequate analysis of synonymy. Finally, strong equivalence is finer 
than Parry's analytic equivalence. 2 (_p)) (_p = (_p_~._p)) and 2 (->_p)) 
(-i_p=(_p л ->_p)). But such paradoxical laws hold for analytic equivalence. 
Notice that the law of determinism does not hold in the logic of branching 
time. 
So 2Ap ) Was-always_WiIIAp and 2 _Ap ) Was-aIways_WilIAp. 
Similarly, 2WillAp ) _WillAp. But the following new laws hold for 
historic modalities (44). 
|= (Was_Ap ) _Was_Ap) and |= (JWill-alwaysAp ) Will-always_Ap) 
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Notes 
1. Following Descaries [1641], I distinguish conceptual thoughts from 
other types of thought like perception and imagination whose contents are 
presentations rather than representations of facts. See the Sixth Meditation. 
2. The notion of force comes from G. Frege who used the German term 
"Kraft". See "Gedanke" and "Verneinung" Beitrage zur Philosophic der 
deutschen Idealismus, vol. 1, 1918-1919, and "Gedankengefuge" Beitrage 
zur Philosophic der deutschen Idealismus, vol. 3, 1923-1926. 
3. The most common force markers are verbal mood and sentential 
type. For example, declarative sentences serve to make assertions. 
Interrogative sentences serve to ask questions and imperative sentences to 
give directives. 
4. See our joint book Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, Cambridge 
University Press, 1985, as well D. Vanderveken Meaning and Speech Acts, 
vol. I: Principles of Language Use and vol. II: Formal Semantics of Success 
and Satisfaction, Cambridge University Press, 1990-1991. 
5. In order to be satisfied, an elementary illocutionary act must have a 
true prepositional content. So the traditional correspondence theory of truth 
for propositions is part of the more general theory of satisfaction for 
illocutionary acts. 
6. Non declarative sentences are then also logically related by virtue of 
the truth conditions of propositions which are their senses. For example, the 
sentences "Do it!" and "You could not do it" express illocutionary acts 
which are not simultaneously satisfiable. 
7. For a clear presentation of the di_erences between the two 
ontologies see David Kaplan "How to Russell a Frege-Church" The Journal 
of Philosophy, 716-729, 1971. 
8. The theory of lypes of sense and denotation underlying my 
stratification comes from Alonzo Church "A Formulation of the Logic of 
Sense and Denotation" in P. Henle et al. (eds.) Structure Method and 
Meaning Liberal, Ai ts Press, 1951. 
9. The law of excluded middle holds for success and unsuccess just as 
it holds for truth and falsity. Either an illocutionary act is performed or it is 
not performed in a speech situation. Failure is a special ease of unsuccess 
which occurs only when a speaker makes an unsuccessful attempt to 
perform the illocutionary act. 
10. The notion of circumstance comes from D. Kaplan (1979) "On the 
Logic of Demonstratives". Propositions are true in possible circumstances. 
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A possible circumstance can be a moment of time, a possible world, a pair 
of a moment of time and history. All depends on the logic under 
consideration. 
11. Properties are attributes of degree 1; they are satisfied by sets of 
(unary sequences of) individuals under concepts. 
12. See D.Lewis [1972]. 
13. The present theory of types is cumulative. Unlike Russell I admit 
the type of sets whose elements are of di_erent inferior types. 
14.1 will only consider first order propositions in the present chapter. 
15. The term and notion of intension come from Carnap [1956]. 
16. See Vanderveken [1999] and Vanderveken [2001]. 
17. This example comes from a talk by D. Kaplan at McGill 
University. "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are d ie ren t proper names of 
Venus. 
18. To predicate is not to judge; it is just to apply an attribute to 
arguments. So acts of predication are purely propositional; they are 
independent from force. One can predicate a property of an object of 
reference in asking a question as well as in making an assertion. 
19. See Kripke [1977]. 
20. In case no single individual falls under the concept uc in the 
circumstance m/h according to a valuation val we could also say that that 
valuation is undefined for that concept in that circumstance. In that case, 
possible valuations of individual concepts would be partial functions. 
21. Of course, when the attribute Rn is extensional, atomic proposition 
Rn (ulc, ..., unc) is true according to val at m/h if and only if <val (ulc) 
m/h, ..., val (unc) m/h > 2 val(Rn)m/h. 
22. It is compatible with all the possible truth conditions of that atomic 
proposition according to which it is true in at least one anterior 
circumstance. 
23. Possible truth conditions of other atomic propositions do not 
matter. The truth of any proposition is compatible with all their possible 
truth conditions. 
24. Parry [1933]. 
2.5. On the one hand, a lot of possible truth conditions are compatible 
with the truth in any circumstance of the elementary proposition that the 
biggest whale is a fish, namely all those according to which its atomic 
proposition is true in that circumstance. So we can believe it. On the other 
hand, the truth of the contradiction is not compatible with any possible truth 
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condition of its atomic proposition. Since we know this a priori in 
understanding its truth condition, we cannot believe it. 
26. Cresswell [1975]. 
27. Thus the set of atomic propositions of any elementary proposition 
P is a singleton (ua) and its intension u#(a#t)t is such that, for any 
circumstance c, u#(a#t)t(m/h) = {f 2 (Ua ! PCirconstances) / m/h 2 f(ua)}. 
28. As is well known, the truth of the disjunction in a circumstance is 
compatible with all the possible valuations of its atomic propositions which 
are compatible with the truth of at least one of its arguments in that 
circumstance. But the truth of the conjunction is only compatible with the 
possible valuations which are compatible with the truth of both arguments. 
29. As I [1997] pointed out in "Quantification and the Logic of 
Generalized Propositions" second order predication is not needed for the 
logical analysis of generalization over individual objects. One can remain in 
the simpler formal ontology of first order attributes. Using the classical 
logic of attributes one can analyze new predicated attributes as being 
generalizations of first order attributes. The property of omniscience is a 
universal generalization of the relation of knowing in the intensional logic 
of attributes. See G. Bealer Quality and Concept (1982) for an explanation 
of the operations of generalization on attributes. 
30. We are free because we could do something else from what we 
actually do. 
31. See my forthcoming book Propositions, Truth and Thought. 
32. The term and notion of minimal rationality comes from Cherniak 
[1986]. 
33. See Hintikka [1962]. 
34. According to the actualist point of view (that Occam was the first 
to advocate), the future proposition WillA is rather true at a moment m if 
and only if the proposition that A is true at a moment m' posterior to m 
according to the particular history that represents the actual historic 
continuation of that moment. See Belnap [2001 ]'s arguments against 
actualism. 
35. We do not know how the world will continue. But among all 
alternative moments that could directly follow the present moment we know 
that one and only one will be actual (if the world continues). So among all 
alternative moments that follow immediately any moment m a single one 
would belong to the actual history of this world if that moment m were 
actual. 
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36. As Prior [1967] says, now unpreventable propositions are "those 
outside our power to make true or false". 
37. The notion of analytic implication comes from Parry [1933] and 
[1972]. See also Fine [1986]. 
38. Suppose the set _ Ua contains an atomic proposition ua 
predicating an attribute R in a certain order of n objects under concepts. In a 
propositional logic with attributes, the new set *(_) contains three new 
atomic propositions predicating respectively the historic necessitation _R, 
the temporal posteriorization WillR and anteriorization WasR of that 
attribute of the same objects in the same order. These modal and temporal 
attributes have the following extensions: 
For any ul , ..., u n 2 Uc, < u l , ... , u n > 2 _R (m/h) i__ < ul , ..., u n > 
2 R (m'/h') for all moments m' coinstantaneous with m and histories h' . 
Moreover, < ul , ..., u n > 2 WillR (m/h) i_, for at least one m' > m, < ul , 
..., u n > 2 R (m'/h). And similarly for WasR (m/h) except that m' < m. 
39. For the sake of simplicity, I have interpreted the logical constants 
Tautological and _ as simple propositional connectives that only rearrange 
truth conditions rather than secondorder predicates expressing attributes of 
propositions. According to this interpretation, they do not change the 
structure of constituents. Consequently, all propositional formulas express 
first order propositions in my formal semantics. 
40'. Axioms (MT1-2) are Zanardo [1985]'s axioms of local 
correspondence. 
41. The present philosophical logic is decidable. 
42. See Cresswell [1975]. 
43. See his Philosophical Rumifications in Anderson et al. [1992]. 
44.1 thank Nuel Belnap for having drawn my attention to these laws. 
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